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Abstract
We study how limited commitment in credit markets affects the implementation of open
market operations and characterize when they result in real indeterminacies and when they
have real effects. To do so, we consider a frictional and incomplete market framework where
agents face stochastic trading opportunities and limited commitment in some markets. When
limited commitment does not constraint agents’ choices, we find necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of a unique monetary equilibrium. However, real indeterminacies
are possible when buyers face a binding no-default constraint. We also show that when the
no-default constraint binds and bonds are not priced fundamentally, open market operations
generically have real effects. A sale of government bonds can increase or decrease interest
rates, depending on the nature of equilibria. The direction of the interest rate effects critically
depend on the size of the liquidity premium on government bonds. Finally, government bonds
purchases can be used to rule out real indeterminacies, thus finding another rationale for such
policy.
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1 Introduction
Before the US Great Recession, open market operations (OMO) was the main tool used to im-
plement monetary policy. These operations required the central bank to purchase/sale nominal
government debt in order to change the money supply. Thus during normal times, one could view
an easing of monetary policy as either a decline in short-term interest rates or as an expansionary
OMO that increases the money supply.1 In frictionless frameworks these operations do not alter
long run real allocations, as shown by Wallace (1981) and Lucas (1984).2 To capture both short
and long run real effects, the economic environment needs to exhibit some imperfections. The
literature has considered: (i) nominal rigidities, as in Woodford (1998) and Erceg et al. (2000),
(ii) segmented markets, as in Andrés et al. (2004), Chen et al. (2012), among others, (iii) distor-
tionary taxation, as in Gordon and Leeper (2006), (iv) distributional policies, as in Grossman and
Weiss (1983), Rotemberg (1984), Alvarez and Lippi (2014) or Sterk and Tenreyro (2018), among
others, or (v) different pledgeability among government bonds, as in Rocheteau et al. (2018) and
Dong and Xiao (2019). Here we contribute to the literature by considering the role of limited
commitment.
In this paper we study how limited commitment in credit markets affects the implementation
of OMO and characterize when they result in real indeterminacies and when they have real ef-
fects. To do so, we consider a frictional and incomplete market framework. Agents face stochastic
trading opportunities and limited commitment in credit markets.3 This type of friction yields
an endogenous borrowing constraint. Moreover, agents can also consume and produce an homo-
geneous good, rebalance their portfolio, and repay their private debt in a frictionless Walrasian
market. Finally, there is a government that must finance a constant stream of exogenous expen-
ditures by levying taxes and by issuing nominal bonds as well as fiat money. These two are the
only durable assets in the economy. Other than implementing monetary policy and taxing agents,
the government can exclude buyers from the credit market and impose additional punishments in
case of default.
When limited commitment in credit markets does not constraint agents’ choices, we find nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique monetary equilibrium. However,
multiple stationary equilibria may exist, when buyers face a binding no-default constraint.4 A
different type of real indeterminacy can be observed, as there are regions of the parameter space
where monetary equilibria with a binding and a non binding no-default constraints coexist. Multi-
1Taylor (1993) highlighted that the actual conduct of monetary policy is better captured by a short-term nominal
interest rates rule rather than some measure of the nominal money supply. We refer the reader to Taylor (2007)
for more on this topic.
2Peled (1985), Chamley and Polemarchakis (1984) and Sargent and Smith (1987), among others, extend Wal-
lace’s results in a variety of environments and find that OMO leave real allocations unaltered.
3In contrast to Carapella and Williamson (2015), limited commitment applies to just private credit.
4These real indeterminacies are fairly robust to different parameter configurations.
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plicity of stationary equilibria relies on the dynamic complementarity between current and future
bond liquidity premia. Specifically, if agents expect low (high) liquidity premia in the future,
then their continuation value is relatively high (low). Thus their temptation to default today is
relatively low (high). This mechanism relaxes (tightens) the borrowing constraint in the current
period, making bonds relative less (more) scarce. This is consistent with observing a low (high)
liquidity premium today. Thus, the original belief is self-fulfilling, and can deliver multiple sta-
tionary equilibria. These can be indexed by the corresponding liquidity premium. We also find
that generically OMO have long run real effects when public debt has a liquidity premium. More
precisely, we show that the off-equilibrium partial confiscation is a necessary condition for OMO
to have real effects.5 As a result, government debt plays an important role in disciplining credit
market behavior.6 Moreover, for economies with a unique monetary equilibrium consistent with a
binding no-default constraint, we show that a sale of government bonds lowers the interest rate.
When multiple equilibria consistent with a binding no-default constraint exist, OMO have differen-
tial effects on interest rates. In particular, they can increase or decrease the nominal interest rate,
depending on the size of the bonds’ liquidity premium. Finally, when the equilibrium with a bind-
ing borrowing constraint coexists with a slack one, a sale of government bonds lowers the interest
rate when bonds are priced above their fundamental value. Such operation leaves interest rates
unaltered when bonds are priced fundamentally. The mechanism underpinning the effects of OMO
on interest rates is a direct consequence of taxes adjusting to satisfy the government budget con-
straint. This leaves buyers’ equilibrium payoff unchanged. However, this operation changes buyers’
off-equilibrium continuation value, tightening their endogenous borrowing constraint. Thus, the
nominal interest rate needs to adjust to satisfy the binding no-default constraint. The direction
of the interest rate adjustment depends on the size of the liquidity premium.
When real indeterminacies emerge, we show that purchases of government bonds can be used
as an equilibrium selection mechanism. In particular, a sufficiently loose monetary policy with
appropriate OMO can select the equilibrium with a slack no-default constraint. Finally, we further
investigate the real effects of OMO by calibrating the model to the US economy from 1984 to
2007. By changing the off-equilibrium taxation, we can obtain multiple stationary equilibria. One
monetary equilibrium is consistent with a slack and one with a binding no-default constraint. We
also find that a tightening of monetary policy makes bond less scarce, thus reducing their liquidity
premium. In the other stationary monetary equilibrium OMO are irrelevant.
5Partial confiscation is similar to Chapter 7 bankruptcy where, upon default, an agent can retain part of his
exempt property.
6This function of public debt is similar to Carapella and Williamson (2015).
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2 Literature
This paper connects with two different strands of literature. One that studies OMO in environ-
ments where financial markets are Walrasian. The other literature we relate to, is one where
monetary policy is analyzed in an environment with flexible prices where some markets are incom-
plete, there are stochastic trading opportunities in some goods markets and government bonds
can exhibit an endogenous liquidity premium.
In Wallace’s (1981) seminal paper, when markets are complete, OMO do not have real effects.
The author characterizes a class of government open market exchanges of capital for fiat currency
that leave the equilibrium sequences for the price level and for real allocations unaffected.7 When
money is dominated in the rate of return, Sargent and Smith (1987) show that OMO do not affect
real allocations.8 Within the same spirit, Schreft and Smith (1998) consider a monetary growth
model with nominal debt, where agents face spatial separation and limited communication. The
authors show that contractionary monetary policy has differential effects on the nominal interest
rate depending on the equilibrium where agents are trading nominal government liabilities. The
authors also show that appropriate OMO can be used to rule out multiple steady states.
This paper also complements the literature that analyzes OMO in environments with frictions
and bonds can exhibit a liquidity premium. Schabert (2004) considers nominal rigidities in an
environment with a Taylor rule where Ricardian equivalence doesn’t apply. This is the case
as households can rebalance their portfolio through a financial intermediary that participates in
repurchase agreement with the central bank, and government bonds are the only collateral in these
procedures. Because of nominal rigidities, the author shows that expansionary fiscal policies tend
to stimulate real activity. However, interest rate adjustments aimed at stabilizing the economy
may hinder such stimulus. When flexible prices are considered in environments with incomplete
markets and stochastic trading opportunities, Berensten and Waller (2011) show that traditional
OMO have real effects. When private liquidity is issued by banks, Williamson (2012) shows that
OMO are neutral when there are plentiful interest-bearing assets but not when they are scarce. In
the latter case, a one time open market sale of government bonds reduces the liquidity premium
on these government liabilities, increasing the nominal interest rate.
When long and short term real bonds are taken into account and these can be accepted as
payment in some states of the world, Dong and Xiao (2019) show how OMO affects real allocations
through a consumption channel. As in Williamson (2012), the authors find that open market sale
7Within the same spirit, Peled (1985) shows that open market operations between money and indexed bonds
do not matter for allocations despite their different risk characteristics. When productive capital is considered,
Chamley and Polemarchakis (1984) describe a government strategy of purchasing capital, financed by alterations
in the stock of government issued currency, that leaves the real allocation unaltered.
8The authors show that so long as the government has the ability to issue a sufficiently rich set of state contingent
liabilities, OMO do not alter real allocations.
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of government bonds increase the nominal interest rate. Within ta similar framework, Rocheteau
et al. (2018) show that when pledgeability is exogenous, the stationary monetary equilibrium is in
general unique and OMO have real effects only if bonds are scarce. However, if pledgeability, is
endogenous, multiple equilibria with different trading patterns can emerge. OMO always have real
effects and have a differential impact on the nominal interest rate depending on which stationary
equilibria agents are trading.
3 The Environment
The basic structure builds on the frictional and incomplete market framework of Lagos and Wright
(2005) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005). Time is discrete and there is a continuum of infinitively
lived buyers and sellers, both of measure one that discount the future at a rate β ∈ (0, 1). These
agents have access to fiat money and nominal government bonds. These are the only durable assets
in the economy. Agents face technological shocks, have stochastic trading opportunities and trade
sequentially in various markets that are characterized by different frictions. In particular, each
period has two sub-periods. In the second sub-period, after the technology shocks are realized,
agents have stochastic and bilateral trading opportunities in a decentralized frictional goods market
(DM). Finally, in the first sub-period, agents trade in a frictionless centralized market (CM), where
they can produce and consume a general good, re-adjust their portfolio, decide whether to pay
their private debt and meet their tax obligations.
Preferences and Technologies
Agents have preferences over consumption of the general CM perishable good (Xt), effort to
produce the CM good (Ht), consumption of the specialized DM perishable good (qt) and effort to
produce the DM good (ht). More precisely buyers have the following preferences
∞∑
t=0
βt [U(Xt)−Ht + u(qt)]
where u(x) and U(·) are concave and satisfy standard utility properties. Sellers, on the other
hand, have the following preferences
∞∑
t=0
βt [U(Xt)−Ht − ht] .
All perishable goods are produced according to a linear technology where labor is the only
input. The production function is such that one unit of labor yields one unit of output.
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All buyers are matched with a seller in DM. However, with probability n buyers are matched
with sellers that have access to a technology that allows them to write contracts and issue unsecured
credit. This technology lets sellers create a verifiable record of the DM trades that can be easily
accessible.9 In case of default, the buyer’s type is permanent and is observed by everyone. We
denote these buyers as C-buyers. With complementary probability, buyers are matched with sellers
that do not have the technology that makes credit feasible. We refer these agents as N-buyers.
Finally, we assume that all buyers face limited commitment in DM.
Timing and Assets
The only durable objects in this economy are fiat money and nominal bonds. As in Berentsen
and Waller (2011), Martin (2011) and Dominguez and Gomis-Porqueras (2019), among others,
government bonds are viewed as book-entries in the government’s record.10 Agents in DM do not
have access to the financial record-keeping technology that keeps track of the identity of the owner
of government bonds. This implies that households are not anonymous to the government in DM.
At the beginning of the period, buyers in DM are bilaterally matched with sellers and they
exchange money for goods. C-buyers can also access credit, however they face a limited commit-
ment problem. After trade has taken place in DM, agents enter the competitive frictionless CM.
In this market there is a timing mismatch between the government’s repayment of outstanding
debt and buyers’ decision to repay previous private loans. Specifically, first the government pays
a fraction χ of its total debt, then buyers decide whether to repay the loan acquired in the pre-
vious DM market. Then, the government pays the remaining fraction of all outstanding debt to
non-defaulters. Finally, agents decide on their portfolio and consumption profiles.
Government
The government must finance a constant stream of exogenous expenditures, G, through lump sum
CM taxes and by issuing nominal bonds as well as fiat money. The corresponding per period
government budget constraint is given by
φ+1 B+1 + φ+1τ+1 + φ+1 M+1 = G+ φ+1 R B + φ+1 M (1)
9This type of technology is different from Carapella and Williamson (2015), where credit histories are perfect,
but a would-be lender may not have access to credit histories. Moreover, the technology in our environment is also
different from Gu et al. (2013), where their record-keeping technology is imperfect, and with some probability past
trading histories are erased.
10Alternatively, this could be interpreted as a fraction of sellers where government bonds are not recognized as
in Shi et al. (2014) or Rocheteau et al. (2018). This could be endogenized as in Lester et al. (2012), Li et al. (2012),
or Gomis-Porqueras et al. (2017). This treatment is beyond the scope of this paper.
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where M denotes money supply at time t, B represents nominal bonds, R is the gross nominal
interest rate on bonds issued at t, τ+1 represents lump sum taxes levied to the buyer in CM and
φ+1 is the real price of money in terms of the CM good at time t + 1. The payment of interest
on government debt is given throughout CM. The real value of all bond issues at every period is
assumed to be bounded above by a sufficiently large constant as to avoid Ponzi schemes.
To implement monetary policy, the central bank follows a constant money growth rate rule
such that M+1 = γM and also conducts OMO in CM as to keep a constant money to bond
ratio, M = θB, where γ and θ are positive constants chosen by the government. Other than
implementing monetary policy and levying CM taxes, the government can exclude buyers from
the credit market and implement additional punishments in case of default. For instance, the
government imposes an off equilibrium real tax φτ˜ .
3.1 CM Problem
In period t, buyers enter CM with m−1 units of money, b−1 units of nominal bonds, and with the
promise to repay l−1 from the previous DM market. Given that the loan is repaid in the frictionless
market, the loan can be paid using labor, cash, or assets.
Having decided to repay the loan, the value function of a buyer is given by
WBt (m−1, b−1, l−1) = max{X,H,m,b}
{
U(X)−H + V Bt (m, b)
}
(PB)
s.t. X −H + φ m+ φ b+ l−1 ≤ φ m−1 +R−1 φ b−1 − φ τ
where V Bt (m, b) is the buyers’ DM expected value.
Sellers enter CM market with mS−1 units of money, bS−1 nominal bonds, and the payment in
terms of CM good of the previously issued unsecured credit ls−1. Their corresponding value function
is given by
W St (m
S
−1, b
S
−1, l
s
−1) = max{XS ,HS ,mS ,bS ,lS−1}
{
U(XS)−HS + V St (mS, bS)
}
(P S)
s.t. XS −HS + φ mS + φ bS ≤ φ mS−1 +R φ bS−1 + ls−1
where V St (mS, bS) is the sellers’ expected value function in DM.
The first order conditions to these problems are given by
X : U ′(X) = 1 (2)
m : − φ+ ∂ V
B
t (m, b)
∂m
≤ 0 = if m > 0 (3)
b : − φ+ ∂ V
B
t (m, b)
∂b
≤ 0 = if b > 0 (4)
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XS : U ′(XS) = 1 (5)
mS : − φ+ ∂ V
S
t (m
S, bS)
∂mS
≤ 0 = if mS > 0 (6)
bS : − φ+ ∂ V
S
t (m
S, bS)
∂bS
≤ 0 = if bS > 0 (7)
with the following envelope conditions for the CM value function
∂ WBt (m−1, b−1, l−1)
∂m−1
=
∂ W St (m
S
−1, b
S
−1, l
s
−1)
∂mS−1
= φ (8)
∂ WBt (m−1, b−1, l−1)
∂b−1
=
∂ W St (m
S
−1, b
S
−1, l
s
−1)
∂bS−1
= φ R−1. (9)
3.2 DM Problem
A buyer enters DM with a portfolio of money and bonds (m, b). With probability n buyers can
purchase the specialized good using fiat money and unsecured credit. With probability 1 − n
buyers can only finance DM consumption with fiat money. Thus, the value function of a buyer
that enters DM, before the shock is realized, is given by
V Bt (m, b) = n V
B,C
t (m, b) + (1− n) V B,Nt (m, b)
where V B,Ct (m, b) is the value function of a buyer who has access to credit and V
B,N
t (m, b) is the
value function of a buyer that only uses fiat money.
We assume that the terms of trade in DM are given by a buyer take-it-or-leave-it offer. The
buyer who does not have access to unsecured credit solves the following problem
V B,Nt (m, b) = max{qnldnlm}
{
u(qnl) + β Wt+1(m− dnlm, b, 0)
}
s.t. − qnl + β W St+1(mS + dnlm, bS, 0) ≥ β W St+1(mS, bS, 0)
dnlm ≤ m
where the first constraint is the seller’s participation constraint with threat point corresponding
to no-trade, qnl is the DM-quantity traded and dnlm is the corresponding cash payment. The second
constraint is the feasibility over money balances, whereby a buyer cannot hand in more money
balances than the ones that he has brought into the match. Using the linearity ofW St+1(mS, bS, ls),
we can rewrite the previous problem as
V B,Nt (m, b) = max{qnl,dnlm}
{
u(qnl)− β φ+1 dnlm + β WBt+1(m, b, 0)
}
(10)
s.t. − qnl + β φ+1 dnlm ≥ 0 (11)
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dnlm ≤ m. (12)
The optimal terms of trade are such that constraint (11) always binds, and either i) the payment
constraint (12) is slack, which implies qnl = q∗, dnlm =
q∗
φ+1
, where q∗ solves u′(q∗) = 1, or ii) the
payment constraint (12) binds, which results in dnlm = m, qnl = β φ+1 m ≤ q∗. From now on, we
assume positive nominal interest rates, so the cash constraint (12) holds with equality. Thus, the
terms of trade are given by
dnlm = m (13)
qnl = β φ+1d
nl
m (14)
which imply the following envelope condition for the N-buyer
∂ V B,Nt (m, b)
∂ m
= u′(qnl) β φ+1 (15)
∂ V B,Nt (m, b)
∂ b
= β
∂ WBt+1(m, b, 0)
∂ b
= β R φ+1. (16)
Similarly, for buyers that can use fiat money and unsecured credit to purchase DM goods, the
optimal terms of trade {dlm, ql, l} solve the following problem
V B,Ct (m, b) = max{ql,dlm,l}
{
u(qnl)− βφ+1dlm − βl + β WBt+1(m, b, 0)
}
(17)
s.t. − ql + β φ+1 dlm + β l ≥ 0 (18)
dlm ≤ m (19)
− l +R φ+1 b+WBt+1(0, 0, 0) ≥ χ R φ+1b+ W˜Bt+1(0, 0) (20)
where (18) is the seller’s participation constraint, (19) represents the feasibility condition on money
holdings, (20) denotes the no-default constraint that captures the limited commitment problem,
and W˜Bt+1(m, b) is the continuation payoff of a defaulting buyer in CM.
It is easy to check that constraint (18) always binds, such that
ql = β φ+1 d
l
m + β l. (21)
Moreover, optimality requires that
dlm : β φ+1[u
′(ql)− 1− λm] = 0
l : β[u′(ql)− 1− λl] = 0 (22)
where βφ+1λm is the multiplier associated to constraint (19) and βλl represents the multiplier
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associated with (20). Notice that the optimal terms of trade are such that either: i) ql = 1, in
which case λm = λl = 0, or ii) ql < 1, in which case λm = λl = [u′(ql)− 1].
Finally the envelope conditions for the value function of a buyer that has access to unsecured
credit are given by
∂ V B,Ct (m, b)
∂ m
= β
∂ WBt+1(m− d, b, l)
∂ m
+ β φ+1λm = β φ+1[1 + λm]
∂ V B,Ct (m, b)
∂ b
= β
∂ WBt+1(m, b, l)
∂ b
+ βλl φ+1R(1− χ) = β R φ+1[1 + λl(1− χ)].
Having characterized the envelope conditions, we can rewrite the intertemporal conditions (3)
and (4) associated with a buyer CM problem as follows
−φ+ βφ+1
[
n
(
1 + λm
)
+ (1− n)u′(qnl)
]
= 0 (23)
−φ+ βRφ+1
[
1 + n λl (1− χ)
]
= 0. (24)
Similarly, for sellers we can rewrite equations (6) and (7) as follows
−φ+ β φ+1 < 0 (25)
−φ+ β R φ+1 ≤ 0. (26)
From (25) we can conclude that mS = 0. From now on, when bonds are priced fundamentally
we consider equilibria where bs = 0.
3.3 Deviating Buyer’s Problem
Finally, we have to determine the value function W˜t(m˜−1, b˜−1) of a buyer that defaulted on a
previous loan, and therefore he can only use money in DM. Let V˜t(m˜) be his DM value function,
which is given by
V˜t(m˜, b˜) = max
{q˜,d˜m}
u(q˜) + β W˜t+1(m˜− d˜m, b˜) (P˜B,N)
s.t. − q˜ + βφ+1d˜m ≥ 0
m˜− d˜m ≥ 0.
In CM, a buyer that has previously defaulted on a loan solves the following problem
W˜t(m˜−1, b˜−1) = φm˜−1 + φ R b˜−1 − φ τ˜ + max
{X˜,m˜,b˜}
{U(X˜)− X˜ − φ m˜− φb˜+ V˜t(m˜, b˜)} (P˜B)
where φτ˜ is the off-equilibrium tax.
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Throughout the rest of the paper we focus on stationary monetary equilibria.
4 Monetary Equilibrium
Given exogenous government expenditures and operating procedures for monetary and fiscal policy
(G, γ, θ, χ, φτ˜), a stationary monetary equilibrium consists of a list of constant quantities and
prices {X,XS, φ m, φ b, φmS, φ bS, qnl, φ dnlm, ql, φ dlm, φM , φ B, φ τ , R, βλl, βγφλm} that satisfy
buyers’ and sellers’ optimality conditions, and markets clear.
Lemma 4.1 At a stationary monetary equilibrium, it must be that R ∈ [R,R], where R =
γ
β+n(1−χ)(γ−β) and R =
γ
β
.
All Proofs can be found in the Appendix.
It is worth highlighting that R > 1, which precludes liquidity trap equilibria. This is the
case as fiat money can always be used as a medium of exchange in DM. Moreover, note that the
interval
[
R,R
]
becomes smaller when χ increases. For χ = 1, the only interest rate consistent
with a stationary monetary equilibrium is R.
Corollary 4.2 If χ = 1 bonds are priced fundamentally, R = γ
β
.
When χ = 1, borrowers can retain the entire bond proceeds upon default. Therefore, govern-
ment bonds have the same payoff on and off-equilibrium. They do not expand buyers’ consumption
possibilities. As a result, buyers are willing to hold bonds only if these are priced fundamentally.
For R ∈ [R,R], using equations (22), (23), and (24), define the functions
ql(R) = u
′−1
(
1 +
γ
βR
− 1
n(1− χ)
)
, qnl(R) = u
′−1
 γβ − n(1−χ)+ γβR−11−χ
1− n
 . (27)
Notice that the functions in equation (27) are well-defined if n ∈ (0, 1) and χ < 1. Using
equations (27), define the borrowing limit
Ψ(R) = −q
nl(R)
β
+
n
[
u
(
ql(R)
)
− ql(R)
]
+ (1− n)
[
u
(
qnl(R)
)
− qnl(R)
]
1− β − χR
qnl(R)
βθ
−
G+ u
(
u
′−1
(
γ
β
))
− γ
β
u
′−1
(
γ
β
)
− φτ˜
1− β . (28)
Equation (28) gives the largest loan in DM that buyers can credibly promise to repay. We can then
characterize stationary monetary equilibria by considering the loan schedule l(R) = q
l(R)−qnl(R)
β
and the borrowing limit Ψ(R) over the interval [R,R].
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Lemma 4.3 If n ∈ (0, 1) and χ < 1, a stationary monetary equilibrium is characterized by a
nominal interest rate R that satisfies
R =
{
Rˆ ∈ [R, γ
β
) and q
l(Rˆ)−qnl(Rˆ)
β
= Ψ(Rˆ)
γ
β
and
ql( γ
β
)−qnl( γ
β
)
β
≤ Ψ( γ
β
).
(29)
An interest rate Rˆ at which l(Rˆ) = Ψ(Rˆ) defines a stationary monetary equilibrium with a
binding no-default constraint. Also, the borrowing constraint can hold as a weak inequality if
bonds are priced fundamentally, i.e. R = γ
β
. Generically, there can be a unique or multiple steady
states. Figure 1 shows the different type of unique monetary equilibria that can emerge in our
environment.11
RR  
 
l(R)
 (R)
1
(a) Unique slack.
RR  
 
l(R)
 (R)
1
(b) Unique binding.
Figure 1: Loan in DM, borrowing limit, and unique stationary monetary equilibrium.
Figure 1a describes a situation where the no-default constraint is slack. This corresponds to a
situation where nominal bonds are priced fundamentally. Uniqueness can also occur when bonds
are not priced fundamentally and the no-default constraint binds. This type of equilibrium is
illustrated in Figure 1b.
Our environment can also yield multiple steady states, thus allowing for real indeterminacies.
These are possible under different circumstances, which are illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2a corresponds to an economy where there exist two steady states with binding borrow-
ing constraints. Thus, nominal bonds are not priced fundamentally in neither of the two equilibria.
Finally, a different type of multiplicity can emerge, which is depicted in Figure 2b. More specif-
ically, a steady state with a binding borrowing constraint coexists with a steady state where the
no-default constraint is slack.
11In Figure 1 the function Ψ(R) is always monotone increasing, but this doesn’t have to be necessarily the case.
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RR  
 
l(R)
 (R)
1
(a) Multiple binding.
RR  
 
l(R)
 (R)
1
(b) Coexistence binding and slack.
Figure 2: Loan in DM, borrowing limit, and multiple stationary monetary equilibria.
4.1 Unique Stationary Monetary Equilibrium
The possibility of multiple equilibria hinges on the punishment upon default, as well as on the
existence of two states of the world that have differential use for unsecured credit. Indeed, a
stationary monetary equilibrium is unique when government bonds have the same use on and
off-equilibrium. A stationary monetary equilibrium is also unique when bonds have the same use
in all states of the world.
Lemma 4.4 When n = 1 or n = 0 there may exist at most one monetary equilibrium.
When n = 0, government bonds do not indirectly expand buyers’ consumption opportunities.
As a result, buyers are willing to hold bonds only if these are priced fundamentally. In contrast,
when n = 1 (and χ < 1), government bonds may help relax the limited commitment problem.
However, there exists a unique nominal interest rate consistent with a stationary monetary equi-
librium, as buyers can not substitute consumption across states of the world. Since γ > β, the
unique stationary monetary equilibrium must be consistent with a binding no-default constraint.
This is the case as when n = 1, at an equilibrium consistent with a slack no-default constraint,
buyers consume the efficient level q∗. Since γ > β, their money demand would have to be φm = 0.
Throughout the rest of this section, we consider economies where n ∈ (0, 1) and χ < 1. We
provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness of a stationary monetary equilibrium.
4.1.1 Slack No-default Constraint
In this monetary equilibrium, buyers that are able to use unsecured credit in DM consume the
efficient quantity, and nominal bonds are priced fundamentally. This is the case as they do not
help expand the DM consumption possibilities. This implies that the multipliers are λl = λm = 0.
Proposition 4.5 When u(x) = x1−σ
1−σ , n <
1−β
γ−β , and σ <
1
(1−χ)( γβ−n)
, there exists a unique station-
ary monetary equilibrium, where the no-default constraint is slack, if we satisfy
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G− φτ˜ < min
 σ1− σ
[
n−
(
γ
β
)− 1−σ
σ
]
+
(
γ
β − n
1− n
)− 1
σ
[
γ
β − n
1− σ − (1− n)−
χγ(1− β)
θβ2
]
− 1− β
β
,
(
γ
β
)− 1
σ
[
γ − 1
β
− χ
βθ
γ(1− β)
β + n(1− χ)(γ − β)
]}
.
(30)
From (30), note that, other than the curvature of the utility function (that reflects the value
of insurance), off-equilibrium taxes and government spending are also relevant for the existence of
a unique stationary monetary equilibrium.
4.1.2 Binding No-default Constraint
In this monetary equilibrium buyers that are able to use unsecured credit in DM cannot consume
the first best quantity. In particular, we have that β
γ
φλm = βλl = u
′(ql)−1 > 0. In this equilibrium
buyers are willing to buy nominal bonds above their fundamental value. This is the case as by
acquiring more bonds, buyers are able to increase their borrowing limit. This allows them to
increase their DM consumption when unsecured credit is available.
Proposition 4.6 When u(x) = x
1−σ
1−σ , n <
1−β
γ−β , and σ <
1
(1−χ)( γβ−n)
, there exists a unique station-
ary monetary equilibrium, where the no-default constraint is binding, if we satisfy the following
condition(
γ
β
)− 1
σ
[
γ − 1
β
− χ
βθ
γ(1− β)
β + n(1− χ)(γ − β)
]
> G− φτ˜
>
σ
1− σ
[
n−
(
γ
β
)− 1−σ
σ
]
+
(
γ
β − n
1− n
)− 1
σ
[
γ
β − n
1− σ − (1− n)−
χγ(1− β)
θβ2
]
− 1− β
β
(31)
The parameter restriction and the specification of the utility function in Proposition 4.6 guar-
antee that the difference between the borrowing limit and the loan schedule is a concave function.
This ensures that, generically, there exist at most two interest rates that make this difference equal
to zero. Moreover, equation (31) guarantees that this difference can be equal to zero for at most
one interest rate.
4.2 Multiple Stationary Equilibria
4.2.1 Binding No-default Constraint
The possibility of multiple equilibria hinges on the future continuation value, which critically
depends on the nominal interest rate on government bonds. If the buyer expects a high interest
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rate tomorrow, the temptation to default becomes smaller. This is the case as the interest rate
foregone by defaulting and the future expected utility are also larger. Thus, today the seller is
willing to extend the buyer a larger loan. As a result, bonds prices are lower, which is consistent
with an increase in the interest rate. Thus, expecting a higher interest rate is self-fulfilling.
Proposition 4.7 When u(x) = x
1−σ
1−σ , n <
1−β
γ−β , σ <
1
(1−χ)( γβ−n)
, and fundamentals are such that
G− φτ˜ > max
 σ1− σ
[
n−
(
γ
β
)− 1−σ
σ
]
+
(
γ
β − n
1− n
)− 1
σ
[
γ
β − n
1− σ − (1− n)−
χγ(1− β)
θβ2
]
− 1− β
β
,
(
γ
β
)− 1
σ
[
γ − 1
β
− χ
βθ
γ(1− β)
β + n(1− χ)(γ − β)
]}
,
(32)
and
Ψ(Ro)− q
l(Ro)− qnl(Ro)
β
> 0 (33)
where
Ro = argmax
R∈[R,R)
{
Ψ(R)− q
l(R)− qnl(R)
β
}
,
then there exist two stationary monetary equilibria, both consistent with a binding no-default con-
straint.
Proposition 4.7 provides sufficient conditions for the existence of two equilibria where the no-
default constraint binds. One is consistent with a low and one with a high interest rate. From
now on, we will refer to the equilibrium with a low (high) interest rate as the low (high) monetary
equilibrium. The low monetary equilibrium delivers larger real money balances and lower credit.
Instead, the high monetary equilibrium is associated with lower money holdings and larger credit.
The coexistence of these equilibrium allocations is a direct result of the complementarity between
the interest rate and DM credit.
4.2.2 Binding and non-Binding Equilibria
We analyze under what conditions equilibria with a binding no-default constraint co-exist with an
equilibrium where (20) is slack.
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Proposition 4.8 When u(x) = x
1−σ
1−σ and we satisfy the following condition
σ
1− σ
[
n−
(
γ
β
)− 1−σ
σ
]
+
(
γ
β − n
1− n
)− 1
σ
[
γ
β − n
1− σ − (1− n)−
χγ(1− β)
θβ2
]
− 1− β
β
> G− φτ˜ >
(
γ
β
)− 1
σ
[
γ − 1
β
− χ
βθ
γ(1− β)
β + n(1− χ)(γ − β)
]
,
(34)
then there exist a unique stationary equilibrium with a slack no-default constraint and at least
one stationary equilibrium with a binding no-default constraint. Moreover, if n < 1−β
γ−β and σ <
1
(1−χ)( γβ−n)
the equilibrium with a binding no-default constraint is unique.
When conditions in Proposition 4.8 are satisfied, an equilibrium where bonds are scarce coexists
with one in which bonds are abundant and are priced fundamentally. In general, the rational
behind the existence of multiple equilibria is different from Rocheteau et al. (2018), as it relies on
the dynamic complementarity of today’s and tomorrow’s payoff. This mechanism is common in
limited commitment problems.12
Proposition 4.9 When u(x) = x
1−σ
1−σ , agents face pledgeability rather then limited commitment,
and the following condition holds
σ <
1
(1− χ)
[
γ
β
− n
] ,
then there exists a unique monetary equilibrium, where the borrowing constraint is either slack or
binding.
When buyers face limited pledgeability, the possibility of multiple self-fulling interest rates
supporting the same allocation can not be consistent with a monetary equilibrium. However,
when the underlying friction is limited commitment, multiplicity can occur. From Lemma 4.4 and
the last proposition we see that the possibility of multiple equilibria hinges on the existence of
two states of the world that have differential use for unsecured credit. This allows for self-fulfilling
prophecies.
5 Open Market Operations
Having characterized the existence of monetary equilibria, we now analyze the effect of open
market operations (OMO) on resulting allocations. As Wallace (1981) and Lucas (1984) highlight,
one way to interpret Ricardian equivalence in a monetary economy is as an irrelevance proposition
12See Gu, Mattesini, Monnet, and Wright (2013) and Bethune et al. (2018) for more on the multiplicity of
equilibria in limited commitment environments.
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about OMO. However, when agents trade in incomplete markets and face distortionary taxes,
OMO can have real effects.
Proposition 5.1 When agents face a slack no-default constraint, open market operations have no
real effects.
Even though agents face some market incompleteness, our results are consistent with Wallace
(1981), among others, as assets are priced fundamentally. In frictional and incomplete environ-
ments, Dong and Xiao (2019), Berentsen et al. (2016) Rocheteau et al. (2018), find similar results.
Lemma 5.2 Open market operations have real effects when n ∈ (0, 1), χ ∈ (0, 1), and the equi-
librium with a binding no-default constraint exists.
In our environment there is a differential treatment between taxes on and off the equilibrium.
This can have consequences for OMO as long as there is partial repayment of government bonds
upon an agent’s private default. Since on-equilibrium taxes are lump-sum, they will adjust to
offset the fiscal pressures of changing the money-to-bond ratio. Moreover, the off-equilibrium tax
is such that the money-to-bond ratio does not alter the deviator’s portfolio decision. Thus, on
and off-equilibrium, lump-sum taxes alone cannot have real effects. However, if upon default the
deviator can retain part of the returns on previous bond holdings, OMO have a direct impact on
the endogenous borrowing constraint. This is the case even if the distortionary taxation is in the
off-equilibrium and for one period. These features make our economy non-Ricardian. Then, it is
not surprising that OMO can have real effects.
5.1 Interest Rates
In frictionless and flexible price environments, a one-time purchase of public debt does not change
nominal interest rates. However, when nominal rigidities are present, the same procedure, in the
short run, delivers a decrease in the nominal interest rate. Moreover, when liquidity considerations
are taken into account and government bonds are scarce, a one time open market sale of government
bonds have long-run real effects. In particular, Williamson (2012) shows that these operations
reduce the liquidity premium on these government liabilities, increasing the nominal interest rate.
Similarly, in an environment where agents face pledgeability problems, Rocheteau et al. (2018)
find the same type of results.
In contrast to these previous results, in our model the effects of a one-time purchase of public
debt depends on the equilibrium that emerges. This is consistent with Schreft and Smith (1998)
and Rocheteau et al. (2018) with endogenous acceptability of payments in frictional markets.
Proposition 5.3 When u(x) = x
1−σ
1−σ , n <
1−β
γ−β , and σ <
1
(1−χ)( γβ−n)
hold, we can establish the
following
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1. If (31) is satisfied, then a decrease in the money-to-bond ratio lowers the unique equilibrium
nominal interest rate.
2. If (32) and (33) are satisfied, a decrease in the money-to-bond ratio lowers the nominal
interest rate associated with the high monetary equilibrium, while increases the interest rate
for the low monetary equilibrium.
3. If (34) is satisfied, then a decrease in the money-to-bond ratio increases the nominal interest
rate associated with the low monetary equilibrium, and has no effect on the high monetary
equilibrium because bonds are priced fundamentally.
Case 1 of Proposition 5.3 is in sharp contrast to what Williamson (2012) finds. This is the
case as taxes adjust to satisfy the government budget constraint, leaving buyers’ equilibrium
payoff unchanged. Instead, in the off-equilibrium buyers face a different continuation value, which
tightens their endogenous borrowing constraint. Thus, the nominal interest rate needs to adjust
to satisfy the binding no-default constraint.
In Case 2 OMO can have differential real effects. This is the case as both monetary equilibria
have a binding no-default constraint. Thus public debt is scarce, exhibiting a liquidity premium.
As in Case 1, the only possible adjustment is through the interest rate. However, there are
two nominal interest rates that are consistent with self-fulling beliefs. As in Williamson (2012)
and Rocheteau et al. (2018) with exogenous pledgeability, at the high monetary equilibrium, an
open market sale of government bonds increases the nominal interest rate. However, for the low
monetary equilibrium, such operating procedure has the opposite effect.
Finally, when the equilibrium in Case 3 emerges, OMO do not always have real effects. When
bonds are priced fundamentally these operations are irrelevant. Instead, when bonds are scarce
the impact of OMO on interest rates is as in Williamson (2012) and Rocheteau et al. (2018) with
exogenous pledgeability.
Proposition 5.4 If agents face limited pledgeability rather then limited commitment, and the
following condition holds
σ <
1
(1− χ)
[
γ
β
− n
] ,
then a decrease in the money-to-bond ratio is irrelevant if the limited pledgeability constraint is
slack, and increases the nominal interest rate if the limited pledgeability constraint binds.
The result in Proposition 5.4 highlights the importance of the dynamic complementarity in
shaping the effects of OMO on nominal interest rates. In particular, in environments with limited
pledgeability, a sale of government bonds always relaxes the borrowing constraint. Such operation
has real effects when the pledgeability constraint binds, increasing the nominal interest rate.
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5.2 Equilibrium Selection
There is a long tradition in economics that emphasizes that government policies can be used as
an equilibrium selection device.13 Thus, it is important to think how policies can help rule out
real indeterminacies. In our context, OMO can be used to select an equilibrium and rule out
indeterminacies. In particular, consider economies where an equilibrium with a slack no-default
constraint coexists with one consistent with a binding no-default constraint. In such scenario, an
appropriate increase in the money to bond ratio selects the equilibrium with a slack no-default
constraint.
Proposition 5.5 Suppose that u(x) = x
1−σ
1−σ , n <
1−β
γ−β , σ <
1
(1−χ)( γβ−n)
, and θ is such that an
equilibrium with a binding no-default constraint coexists with one where the no-default constraint
is slack. Then, there exists a policy θ′ > θ that selects the equilibrium with a slack no default
constraint whenever
G− φτ˜ < min
 σ1− σ
[
n−
(
γ
β
)− 1−σσ ]
+
(
γ
β − n
1− n
)− 1σ [ γ
β − n
1− σ − (1− n)
]
− 1− β
β
,
(
γ
β
)− 1σ γ − 1
β
 . (35)
When parameter configurations are such that the multiplicity of equilibria described in Propo-
sition 5.5 is observed, then an open market purchase of government bonds that results in a money
to bond ratio equal to θ′ is inconsistent with self-fulfilling beliefs that deliver an equilibrium
with a binding no-default constraint. Government bonds purchases can be used to rule out real
indeterminacies, thus finding another rationale for such policy.
6 Numerical Examples
In this section we quantify some of the model equilibrium properties. In our benchmark calibration,
we assume that there exists a unique equilibrium with a slack no-default constraint. Thus the
frictional consumption when unsecured credit is feasible is efficient, ql = 1 = q∗, and bonds are
priced fundamentally. We then explore the resulting monetary equilibria as χ and φτ˜ change.
Our analysis uses US quarterly data from 1984 to 2007.14 To pin down the fraction of DM
trades where unsecured credit is not available, we follow Aruoba et al. (2011) and set n = 0.15.
We then consider the average inflation and nominal interest rates and match the average money
to bond and government expenditure. In our environment, nominal GDP is Y = Y CM + Y DM .
Assuming the specific functional form, U(X) = ΩXη
η
for CM preferences, nominal output in the
13For instance, see Schreft and Smith (1998), Ennis and Keister (2005), Antinolfi et al. (2007) among others, for
more on this topic.
14In our analysis M corresponds to the monetary base (BOGMBASE), B denotes total public debt
(GFDEGDQ188S); for the long-run inflation rate we consider CPI inflation (CPIAUCSL), and for the nominal
interest rate we take the 1-year treasury constant maturity rate (DGS1).
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centralized market is Y CM = (G + XB + XS)/φ = (2Ω
1
1−η + G)/φ, and nominal output in the
decentralized market is Y DM = n q
l+(1−n)qnl
φ
. In the data, the previous two ratios are given by
θ =
M
B
= 0.0975
and
G
Y
=
G
2Ω
1
1−η +G+ n+ (1− n)qnl
= 0.20. (36)
To pin down the rest of the parameters, we use the methodology from Lucas (2000) and examine
the relationship between the nominal rate, i, and liquidity services, L.15 In equilibrium we have
that liquidity services are given by
L =
φM
Y
=
qnl(1 + i)
(2Ω
1
1−η +G) + n+ (1− n)qnl
. (37)
To determine the values of σ,Ω, and G, we minimize the distance between the observed liquidity
services at three different nominal interest rates and their implied equilibrium counterpart and the
government expenditure to GDP ratio.16 Table 1 summarizes the parameters in the benchmark
calibration.
θ 0.0975 γ 1.0025
β 0.95 σ 0.278
n 0.15 Ω 2.564
g 0.2 η 0.46
Table 1: Benchmark Calibration
As we can see, the calibrated parameters n, γ, β, and σ satisfy both conditions n < 1−β
γ−β and
σ < 1
(1−χ)( γβ−n)
that are assumed in Propositions 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8.
The only two parameters that are left to determine are χ and φτ˜ . In particular, we choose
χ = 0.8 to guarantee that the following condition is satisfied
σ
1− σ
[
n−
(
γ
β
)− 1−σ
σ
]
+
(
γ
β
− n
1− n
)− 1
σ
[
γ
β
− n
1− σ − (1− n)−
χγ(1− β)
θβ2
]
+
− 1− β
β
>
(
γ
β
)− 1
σ
[
γ − 1
β
− χ
βθ
γ(1− β)
β + n(1− χ)(γ − β)
]
(38)
15This relationship represents "money demand" in the sense that "desired" real balances M/P are proportional
to Y , with a factor of proportionality L that depends on the cost of holding cash, i.
16The assumption σ ≤ 1 guarantees that the surplus from trading in DM is non-negative.
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which is necessary (but not sufficient) for the coexistence of equilibria with a binding and a slack
no-default constraint is possible. Finally, to ensure the existence of a unique equilibrium consistent
with a slack no-default constraint, we choose φτ˜ large enough to satisfy condition (30). Specifically,
we restrict off-equilibrium taxes to be
φτ˜ =
1
2
[U(X˜)− (˜X)] + u(q˜)− φm˜.
Under the benchmark calibration, we obtain a unique stationary monetary equilibrium where
the no-default constraint is slack and the resulting endogenous observables are summarized in
Table 2.
l 0.212
qnl 0.799
ql 1
φ m 0.843
φ b 8.64
X 5.72
R 1.055
Table 2: Equilibrium Outcomes.
Since the no-default constraint is slack, consumption in the state where credit is feasible equals
the efficient level, ql = 1, and bonds are priced fundamentally, R = γ
β
. Finally buyers consume less
in states where credit is not feasible, qnl < ql, as carrying real balances across periods is costly.
Note that multiple equilibria can exist when the off-equilibrium taxation changes. In particular,
when
φτ˜ = 0.4624[U(X˜)− (˜X)] + u(q˜)− φm˜,
an equilibrium with a slack no-default constraint coexists with an equilibrium consistent with a
binding no-default constraint. Table 3 reports these monetary stationary equilibria.
In the equilibrium with a binding no-default constraint, we observe a liquidity premium on
bonds. Moreover, consumption inequality in the frictional market is smaller. Furthermore, the
demand for real government bonds is larger. This is a direct consequence of agents facing different
prices. Such real indeterminacy critically depends on the off-equilibrium punishment.
For the previous economy, we show numerically how the equilibrium allocation consistent with
a binding no-default constraint responds to an open market operation.17 The results are presented
in Table 4.
17Recall that open market operations do not have real effects when agents face a slack no-default constraint.
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Slack no-default Binding no-default
l 0.212 0.006
qnl 0.799 0.825
ql 1 0.83
φ m 0.843 0.87
φ b 8.64 8.92
X 5.72 5.72
R 1.055 1.0532
Table 3: Coexistence of stationary equilibria with binding and slack no-default constraint.
θ = 0.0975 θ = 0.0974
l 0.006 0.0283
qnl 0.825 0.821
ql 0.83 0.848
m 0.87 0.867
b 8.92 8.897
X 5.725 5.725
R 1.0532 1.0534
Table 4: The effects of Open Market Operations
Even a small decrease in the money to bond ratio has significant effects on unsecured credit.
More precisely, a 0.1% decrease in θ induces a fivefold increase in real loans. This is the case as
a decrease in the money to bond ratio makes bonds more plentiful, thus relaxing the borrowing
constraint, lowering the liquidity premium on bonds, and expanding buyers’ credit limit. From Ta-
ble 4, we see that the liquidity premium on bonds is lower as the nominal interest rate is increased
by 0.02%. Moreover, because sellers are willing to extend more credit in DM, buyers substitute
consumption across states in DM. Thus they need to acquire fewer cash balances in CM. More
specifically, consumption in the states where credit is possible increased by 2%, whereas consump-
tion in the states where credit is not feasible decreased by 0.5%. The increase in consumption-gap
across the different states of nature is consistent with findings in Coibion et al. (2017), who docu-
ment that consumption inequality increases after monetary contraction. However, the mechanism
in our model does not rely on prices being sluggish.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we study the impact of limited commitment in credit markets on open market opera-
tions. To do so, we consider a monetary, frictional, and incomplete market framework. Agents face
stochastic trading opportunities, anonymity, and limited commitment in frictional markets. These
give rise to an essential medium of exchange and an endogenous borrowing constraint. Finally,
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there is a government that must finance a constant stream of exogenous expenditures by levying
taxes and by issuing nominal bonds as well as fiat money. Other than implementing monetary
policy and taxing agents, the government can exclude buyers from the credit market and impose
additional punishments in case of default.
Within this environment, we characterize the existence of unique and multiple stationary mon-
etary equilibria. We find conditions for the existence of a unique monetary equilibrium: i) with a
slack no-default constraint and ii) with a binding no-default constraint. This environment can also
yield multiple monetary equilibria where at least one of the stationary equilibria has a binding no-
default constraint. In particular, there is a type of real indeterminacy where agents face a binding
and a non binding no-default constraints. All of these real indeterminacies are a direct conse-
quence of the dynamic complementarities arising from the limited commitment problem. This is
in sharp contrast to an environment with exogenous limited pledgeability, where generically the
monetary equilibrium is unique, even when the pledgeability constraint binds.
In this paper we also study the real effects of open market operations. Generically, these
operations have real effects when public debt exhibits a liquidity premia. These are different
depending on the monetary equilibrium that emerges. More precisely, a sale of government bonds
can decrease or increase the nominal interest rate, depending on the nature of the equilibrium.
This is the case as after such sale, taxes adjust to satisfy the government budget constraint,
leaving buyers’ equilibrium payoff unchanged. Instead, in the off-equilibrium buyers face a different
continuation value, which tightens their endogenous borrowing constraint. Thus, the nominal
interest rate needs to adjust to satisfy the binding no-default constraint. As a result, the impact
of these operations on the nominal interest rate depend on the nature of the equilibrium that
emerges. Finally, when real indeterminacies emerge, we show that purchases of government bonds
can be used as an equilibrium selection mechanism.
References
Alvarez, F. and F. Lippi (2014): “Persistent liquidity effects and long-run money demand,”
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 6, 71–107.
Andrés, J., J. D. López-Salido, and E. Nelson (2004): “Tobin’s imperfect asset substitution
in optimizing general equilibrium,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 665–690.
Antinolfi, G., C. Azariadis, and J. Bullard (2007): “Monetary policy as equilibrium
selection,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 331–342.
Berentsen, A., S. Huber, and A. Marchesiani (2016): “The societal benefit of a financial
transaction tax,” European Economic Review, 89, 303–323.
23
Berentsen, A. and C. Waller (2011): “Outside versus inside bonds: a Modigliani–Miller type
result for liquidity constrained economies,” Journal of Economic Theory, 146, 1852–1887.
Bethune, Z., T.-W. Hu, and G. Rocheteau (2018): “Indeterminacy in credit economies,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 175, 556–584.
Carapella, F. and S. Williamson (2015): “Credit markets, limited commitment, and gov-
ernment debt,” The Review of Economic Studies, 82, 963–990.
Chamley, C. and H. Polemarchakis (1984): “Assets, general equilibrium and the neutrality
of money,” The Review of Economic Studies, 51, 129–138.
Chen, H., V. Cúrdia, and A. Ferrero (2012): “The macroeconomic effects of large-scale
asset purchase programmes,” The Economic Journal, 122, F289–F315.
Dominguez, B. and P. Gomis-Porqueras (2019): “The effects of secondary markets for
government bonds on inflation dynamics,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 32, 249–273.
Dong, M. and S. X. Xiao (2019): “Liquidity, monetary policy, and unemployment: a new
monetarist approach,” International Economic Review, doi:10.1111/iere.12374.
Ennis, H. M. and T. Keister (2005): “Government policy and the probability of coordination
failures,” European Economic Review, 49, 939–973.
Erceg, C. J., D. W. Henderson, and A. T. Levin (2000): “Optimal monetary policy with
staggered wage and price contracts,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 46, 281–313.
Gomis-Porqueras, P., T. Kam, and C. Waller (2017): “Nominal exchange rate determinacy
under the threat of currency counterfeiting,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 9,
256–273.
Gordon, D. B. and E. M. Leeper (2006): “The price level, the quantity theory of money, and
the fiscal theory of the price level,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 53, 4–27.
Grossman, S. and L. Weiss (1983): “A transactions-based model of the monetary transmission
mechanism,” The American Economic Review, 73, 871–880.
Gu, C., F. Mattesini, C. Monnet, and R. Wright (2013): “Endogenous credit cycles,”
Journal of Political Economy, 121, 940–965.
Lagos, R. and R. Wright (2005): “A unified framework for monetary theory and policy
analysis,” Journal of Political Economy, 113, 463–484.
24
Lester, B., A. Postlewaite, and R. Wright (2012): “Information, liquidity, asset prices,
and monetary policy,” The Review of Economic Studies, 79, 1209–1238.
Li, Y., G. Rocheteau, and P.-O. Weill (2012): “Liquidity and the threat of fraudulent
assets,” Journal of Political Economy, 120, 815–846.
Lucas, R. E. (1984): “Money in a theory of finance,” in Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series
on Public Policy, North-Holland, vol. 21, 9–46.
Martin, F. M. (2011): “On the joint determination of fiscal and monetary policy,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 58, 132–145.
Peled, D. (1985): “Stochastic inflation and government provision of indexed bonds,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 15, 291–308.
Rocheteau, G. and R. Wright (2005): “Money in search equilibrium, in competitive equilib-
rium, and in competitive search equilibrium,” Econometrica, 73, 175–202.
Rocheteau, G., R. Wright, and S. X. Xiao (2018): “Open market operations,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 98, 114–128.
Rotemberg, J. J. (1984): “A monetary equilibrium model with transactions costs,” Journal of
political Economy, 92, 40–58.
Sargent, T. J. and B. D. Smith (1987): “Irrelevance of open market operations in some
economies with government currency being dominated in rate of return,” The American Eco-
nomic Review, 78–92.
Schabert, A. (2004): “Interactions of monetary and fiscal policy via open market operations,”
The Economic Journal, 114, C186–C206.
Schreft, S. L. and B. D. Smith (1998): “The effects of open market operations in a model of
intermediation and growth,” Review of Economic Studies, 65, 519–550.
Shi, S. et al. (2014): “Liquidity, interest rates and output,” Annals of Economics and Finance,
15, 707–749.
Sterk, V. and S. Tenreyro (2018): “The transmission of monetary policy through redistribu-
tions and durable purchases,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 99, 124–137.
Taylor, J. B. (1993): “Discretion versus policy rules in practice,” in Carnegie-Rochester confer-
ence series on public policy, Elsevier, vol. 39, 195–214.
——— (2007): Monetary policy rules, vol. 31, University of Chicago Press.
25
Wallace, N. (1981): “A Modigliani-Miller theorem for open-market operations,” The American
Economic Review, 71, 267–274.
Williamson, S. D. (2012): “Liquidity, monetary policy, and the financial crisis: A new mone-
tarist approach,” The American Economic Review, 102, 2570–2605.
Woodford, M. (1998): “Control of the public debt: a requirement for price stability?” in The
Debt Burden and Its Consequences for Monetary Policy, Springer, 117–158.
26
Appendix
Deviation value function
Finally, we have to determine the value function W˜t(m˜−1, b˜−1) of a buyer that defaulted on a
previous loan, and therefore he can only use money in the DM. Let V˜t(m˜) be his value function
in DM:
V˜t(m˜, b˜) = max
{q˜,d˜m}
u(q˜) + β W˜t+1(m˜− d˜m, b˜) (P˜B,N)
s.t. − q˜ + βφ+1d˜m ≥ 0
m˜− d˜m ≥ 0
A solution to this problem is such that q˜ = βφ+1d˜m and d˜m = m˜ and q˜ = βφ+1m˜.
In the CM, a buyer that previously defaulted on a loan solves
W˜t(m˜−1, b˜−1) = φm˜−1 + φ R b˜−1 − φ τ˜ + max
{X˜,m˜,b˜}
{
U(X˜)− X˜ − φ m˜− φb˜+ V˜t(m˜, b˜)
}
(P˜B)
The buyer optimal decisions solve
X˜ : − U ′(X˜)− 1 = 0
m˜ : − φ+ ∂V˜t(m˜, b˜)
∂m˜
≤ 0
b˜ : − φ+ ∂V˜t(m˜, b˜)
∂b˜
≤ 0
where the second and third condition must hold with equality if m˜ > 0 and if b˜ > 0. The envelope
conditions are
∂W˜t(m˜−1, b˜−1)
∂m˜−1
= φ
∂W˜t(m˜−1, b˜−1)
∂b˜−1
= φR
Upon default, a buyer will choose b˜ = 0 given that R ≤ γ
β
. Thus, the envelope condition in the
DM gives us
∂V˜t(m˜, b˜)
∂m˜
= βφ+1u
′(q˜)
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which combined with the first order condition for money holdings gives:
−φ+ β φ+1 u′(q˜) = 0
q˜ = β φ+1 m˜
In a stationary equilibrium we can rewrite
−1 + β
γ
u′(q˜) = 0 (39)
q˜ =
β
γ
φ m˜ (40)
Replacing this value in (P˜B) obtain
W˜ (m˜−1, b˜−1) = φm˜−1 + φ R b˜−1 +
U
(
U
′−1
(1)
)
− U ′−1(1) + u
(
u
′−1
(
γ
β
))
− γ
β
u
′−1
(
γ
β
)
− φτ˜
1− β (41)
Proof of Lemma 4.1
From equation (24), we have that
R =
γ
β
1
1 + nλl(1− χ) ≤
γ
β
= R
where we used stationarity of the equilibrium, thus φ
φ+1
= γ, and the fact that λl ≥ 0.
Next, from equations (13) and (14) we have that qnl = β
γ
φm, whereas from equation (22),
when λl = λm = 0, then ql = q∗ > qnl, otherwise when λl = λm > 0, from (21) ql = βγφm + βl =
qnl + βl ≥ qnl. Thus, in general ql ≥ qnl. From equation (23) we have
λl = λm =
γ
β
− (1− n)u′(qnl)
n
− 1.
Combining this equation with λl = u′(ql) − 1, we have nu′(ql) + (1 − n)u′(qnl) = γβ . Because
ql ≥ qnl, it must be that u′(qnl) ≥ γ
β
. Replacing this in the expression for λl we obtain λl ≤ γβ − 1.
Then, in (24) this last inequality gives us
R =
γ
β
1
1 + nλl(1− χ) ≥
γ
β
1
1 + n
(
γ
β
− 1
)
(1− χ)
=
γ
β + n(1− χ)(γ − β) = R.
which concludes the proof.
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Proof of Corollary 4.2
The conclusion follows directly from R = R = γ
β
when χ = 1.
Proof of Lemma 4.3
From equations (2) and (5), X = XS = U−1(1); also, sellers optimal decision in CM is φmS =
φbS = 0. From equations (13), (14), stationarity of equilibrium, and money market clearing,
φdnlm = φd
l
m = φm = φM =
γqnl
β
.18 Also, from the bond market clering condition φb = φB = γq
nl
βθ
.
From (1) φτ = G + γ
β
qnl
[
R
γθ
+ 1
γ
− 1
θ
− 1
]
. Finally, from (21) we have that l = q
l−qnl
β
. We prove
the rest of the lemma by looking separately at an equilibrium with a slack no-default constraint
and then equilibria with a binding no-default constraint.
Equilibrium with a slack no-default constraint
Consider first an equilibrium with a slack no-default constraint: in (20) it must be
l ≤ (1− χ)Rφ+1b+WB(0, 0, 0)− W˜ (0, 0).
From (22) we have λl = 0, ql = q∗ = u′−1(1), and λm = 0. Also, from (24),
R =
γ
β
,
and from (23),
qnl = u
′−1
(
γ
β
− n
1− n
)
Replacing these values in (21) we have that l = q
∗−qnl
β
. Thus, we only have left to check that
the no-default constraint holds. The value function W (0, 0, 0) is
W (0, 0, 0) =
U(X)−X − φm− φb− φτ
1− β +
n u(ql) + (1− n) u(qnl)
1− β +
βR φb
γ
− βnl
1− β (42)
Using equation (41) we can rewrite the no-default constraint (20) as follows:
l ≤n u(q
l) + (1− n) u(qnl)− βnl
1− β +
R φb
γ
− φm− φb− φτ
1− β
18We assume that φ dlm = φm, thus buyers transfer all their money balances also in states when the no-default
constraint is slack. This is without loss of generality, as the composition of payments (money vs. credit) is
indeterminate in this case.
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− χR φb
γ
−
u
(
u
′−1
(
γ
β
))
− γ
β
u
′−1
(
γ
β
)
− φτ˜
1− β
Replacing the values of l, φτ , R, φm, φb, and qnl we can rewrite this equation as
q∗ − u′−1
( γ
β
−n
1−n
)
β
≤−
u
′−1
( γ
β
−n
1−n
)
β
+
n[u(q∗)− q∗] + (1− n)[u
(
u
′−1
( γ
β
−n
1−n
))
− u′−1
( γ
β
−n
1−n
)
]−G
1− β
− χ
θ
γ
β2
u
′−1
(
γ
β
− n
1− n
)
−
u
(
u
′−1
(
γ
β
))
− γ
β
u
′−1
(
γ
β
)
− φτ˜
1− β .
(43)
It is easy to check that, for ql(R) and qnl(R) defined in (27), and Ψ(R) in (28), ql( γ
β
) = q∗,
qnl( γ
β
) = u
′−1
( γ
β
−n
1−n
)
, and Ψ( γ
β
) equals to the right-hand side of equation (43). Thus, an equilibrium
with a slack no-default constraint exists if and only if
ql( γ
β
)−qnl( γ
β
)
β
≤ Ψ( γ
β
), for ql(R) and qnl(R)
defined in (27) and Ψ(R) in (28).
Equilibrium with a binding no-default constraint
When that the no-default constraint binds, we have λm = λl = u′(ql)− 1 ≥ 0 and ql ≤ q∗. From
equations (23) and (24), we can solve for ql and qnl to obtain (27):
ql(R) = u
′−1
(
1 +
γ
βR
− 1
n(1− χ)
)
, qnl(R) = u
′−1
 γβ − n(1−χ)+ γβR−11−χ
1− n
 .
Notice that λl ≥ 0 ql ≤ q∗ if and only if R ≤ R = γ
β
. Also, from the definition of l in (21) and ql
and qnl from (27) we have that l ≥ 0 if and only if R ≥ R = γ
β+n(1−χ)(γ−β) . Then, an equilibrium
with a binding no-default constraint exists if for there is an R ∈ [R,R] such that the no-default
constraint binds and the government budget constraint is satisfied, together with the constant
money growth and the constant money-to-bond ratio. Equations (42) and (41) define the value
functions on and off the equilibrium. Then, replacing W (0, 0, 0) and W˜ (0, 0) from (42) and (41),
ql and qnl from (27), and φτ from (1), we obtain that an equilibrium with a binding no-default
constraint must satisfy
ql(R)− qnl(R)
β
= −q
nl(R)
β
+
n
[
u
(
ql(R)
)
− ql(R)
]
+ (1− n)
[
u
(
qnl(R)
)
− qnl(R)
]
1− β − χR
qnl(R)
βθ
−
G+ u
(
u
′−1
(
γ
β
))
− γ
β
u
′−1
(
γ
β
)
− φτ˜
1− β .
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Thus, an equilibrium with a binding no-default constraint is characterized by a Rˆ ∈ (R,R) such
that q
l(Rˆ)−qnl(Rˆ)
β
= Ψ(Rˆ), for ql(R) and qnl(R) defined in (27) and Ψ(R) in (28).
Proof of Lemma 4.4
Proof. Consider first the case of n = 1. In such a case a monetary equilibrium with a slack
no-default constraint does not exist as long as γ > β. Indeed, when the no-default constraint is
slack, replacing λm = 0 in equation (23) we obtain
−1 + β
γ
= 0,
which can never hold for γ > β. Consider then the equilibrium with a binding no-default con-
straint, in which λm = λl = [u′(ql)− 1]. Equations (23) and (24) become
−1 + β
γ
u′(ql) = 0
−1 + β R
γ
[
1 + (1− χ)
(
u′(ql)− 1
)]
= 0
and equations (18) and (20) give
l =
ql
β
− φm
γ
(44)
ql
β
= −χR φm
θγ
− G
1− β +
u(ql)− ql
1− β (45)
Notice that the first two equations pin down uniquely ql and R, then (45) pins down uniquely φm,
and finally (44) pins down uniquely l.
Consider now the case of n = 0. Equation (23) gives us R = γ
β
, and the model collapses to the
standard Lagos and Wright (2005).
To prove the remaining results, it is easier to transform the problem and characterize the
solution for the transformed problem. To do this, we state an equivalence result in the following
lemma.
Lemma 7.1 Let ql(R), qnl(R) be defined in (27), and Ψ(R) in (28), and define the function
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g : [R,R]→ <+ as follows:
g(R) = u
′−1
 γβ − n− γβR−11−χ
1− n
 . (46)
Note that g(·) is a bijection, that g′(R) < 0, and [g(R), g(R)] =
[
u
′−1
( γ
β
−n
1−n
)
, u
′−1
(
γ
β
)]
. Define
the function F :
[
u
′−1
( γ
β
−n
1−n
)
, u
′−1
(
γ
β
)]
→ < as
F(x) = −
u
′−1
( γ
β
−(1−n)(x)−σ
n
)
β
+
n
[
u
(
u
′−1
( γ
β
−(1−n)(x)−σ
n
))
− u′−1
( γ
β
−(1−n)(x)−σ
n
) ]
+ (1− n)
[
u(x)− x
]
1− β
− χ
θ
γ
β2
x
1 + (1− χ)n
[ γ
β
−(1−n)u′(x)
n
− 1
] − G+ u
(
u
′−1
(
γ
β
))
− γ
β
u
′−1
(
γ
β
)
− φτ˜
1− β (47)
Then, for x ∈
[
u
′−1
( γ
β
−n
1−n
)
, u
′−1
(
γ
β
)]
,
F(x)

> 0 iff Ψ
(
g−1(x)
)
>
ql
(
g−1(x)
)
−qnl
(
g−1(x)
)
β
= 0 iff Ψ
(
g−1(x)
)
=
ql
(
g−1(x)
)
−qnl
(
g−1(x)
)
β
< 0 iff Ψ
(
g−1(x)
)
<
ql
(
g−1(x)
)
−qnl
(
g−1(x)
)
β
Proof. Replacing the function g−1(x) into (47) and rearranging terms we obtain the result.
From Lemma 7.1 and Lemma 4.3, an equilibrium with a slack no-default constraint exists if
ad only if F
(
u
′−1
( γ
β
−n
1−n
))
≥ 0, and an equilibrium with a binding no-default constraint can be
characterized by a xˆ ∈
[
u
′−1
( γ
β
−n
1−n
)
, u
′−1
(
γ
β
)]
such that F(xˆ) = 0. Once we have such xˆ, then
the equilibrium interest rate is Rˆ = g−1(xˆ).
Lemma 7.2 Assume that u(x) = x
1−σ
1−σ , n <
1−β
γ−β , σ <
1
(1−χ)( γβ−n)
. Then, the function F(x) is
concave in the interval
[
u
′−1
( γ
β
−n
1−n
)
, u
′−1
(
γ
β
)]
=
[( γ
β
−n
1−n
)− 1
σ
,
(
γ
β
)− 1
σ
]
.
Proof. Consider F ′(x): after some manipulations, we obtain
F ′(x) =
β(1− n)
[
(x)−σ − 1
]
−
(
γ − 1− β(1− n)
[
(x)−σ − 1
]) (
1−n
n
) ( γ
β
(x)σ−(1−n)
n
)− 1+σ
σ
β(1− β)
− χ γ
θ β2
1 + (1− χ)
(
γ
β
− n
)
− (1− n)(1− χ)(x)−σ (1 + σ){
1 + (1− χ)
[
γ
β
− n− (1− n)(x)−σ
]}2
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Consider now the second derivative F ′′(x):
F ′′(x) = −σβ(1− n)(x)
−σ−1
β(1− β) −
βσ(1− n)(x)−σ−1 ( 1−nn ) ( γβ (x)σ−(1−n)n )− 1+σσ
β(1− β)
+
(
γ − 1− β(1− n)
[
(x)−σ − 1
])
β(1− β)
(
1− n
n
)
(1 + σ)(x)σ−1
(
γ
β (x)
σ − (1− n)
n
)− 1+σσ −1
− χγ
θβ2
σ(x)−(1+σ)(1− n)(1− χ){
1 + (1− χ)
[
γ
β − n− (1− n)(x)−σ
]}3 ×
{
[
1 + (1− χ)
(
γ
β
− n− (1− n)(x)−σ
)]
(1 + σ) + 2
[
1 + (1− χ)
(
γ
β
− n− (1− n)(x)−σ
)]}
Notice that sufficient conditions for F ′′(x) < 0 for all x is that
γ − 1− β(1− n)
[
(x)−σ − 1
]
< 0 for all x
and
1 + (1− χ)
(
γ
β
− n− (1− n)(x)−σ
)
> 0 for all x
The first condition holds if n < 1−β
γ−β and the second condition holds for σ <
1
(1−χ)( γβ−n)
. Therefore,
if n < 1−β
γ−β and σ <
1
(1−χ)( γβ−n)
the function F(x) is concave.
Proof of Proposition 4.5
Proof. Existence of an equilibrium with a slack no-default constraint follows from the fact that
condition (30) guarantees that
ql( γ
β
)−qnl( γ
β
)
β
< Ψ( γ
β
): indeed, from (27) and (28) we obtain
ql(
γ
β
) = q∗ = 1, qnl(
γ
β
) =
(
γ
β
− n
1− n
)− 1
σ
and
Ψ(
γ
β
) = −
( γ
β
−n
1−n
)− 1
σ
β
+
n
[
1
1−σ − 1
]
+ (1− n)
[( γβ−n
1−n
)− 1−σσ
1−σ −
( γ
β
−n
1−n
)− 1
σ
]
1− β − χ
γ
β
( γ
β
−n
1−n
)− 1
σ
βθ
−
G+
( γβ )
− 1−σσ
1−σ − γβ
(
γ
β
)− 1
σ − φτ˜
1− β (48)
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After rearranging, using condition (30) we obtain
(1− β)Ψ(γ
β
) = φτ˜ −G+ σ
1− σ
[
n−
(
γ
β
)− 1−σ
σ
]
+
(
γ
β
− n
1− n
)− 1
σ
[
−1− β
β
− χγ
β2θ
(1− β) +
γ
β
− n
1− σ − (1− n)
]
>
1− β
β
1−( γβ − n
1− n
)− 1
σ
 = 1− β
β
[
ql(
γ
β
)− qnl(γ
β
)
]
from which we conclude Ψ( γ
β
) >
ql( γ
β
)−qnl( γ
β
)
β
.
Uniqueness follows from the fact that condition (30) guarantees also that q
l(R)−qnl(R)
β
< Ψ(R)
and concavity of F(·). Indeed, from (27) and (28) we obtain
ql(R) = qnl(R) =
(
γ
β
)− 1
σ
and
Ψ(R) = −
(
γ
β
)− 1
σ
β
−
(
γ
β
)− 1
σ
1− β − χ
γ
β + n(1− χ)(γ − β)
(
γ
β
)− 1
σ
βθ
−
G− γ
β
(
γ
β
)− 1
σ − φτ˜
1− β (49)
After rearranging, using condition (30) we obtain
(1− β)Ψ(R) = φτ˜ −G+
(
γ
β
)− 1
σ
[
− 1
β
+
γ
β
− χ γ
β + n(1− χ)(γ − β)
1− β
βθ
]
> 0
Thus, given that ql(R) = qnl(R), we conclude that Ψ(R) > q
l(R)−qnl(R)
β
.
Suppose then by contradiction that there exists an equilibrium with a binding no-default
constraint. Then there should exist a Rˆ ∈ (R,R) such that ql(Rˆ)−qnl(Rˆ)
β
= Ψ(Rˆ). From Lemma 7.1,
then F(g(Rˆ)) = 0. But since from condition (30) we have q
l( γ
β
)−qnl( γ
β
)
β
< Ψ( γ
β
), Lemma 7.1 implies
that F(g(R)) > 0. Since the function F is concave, it must be that F ′(x) < 0 for x ≥ g(Rˆ). Thus,
F(g(R)) < 0. But this implies that ql(R)−qnl(R)
β
> Ψ(R), which contradicts condition (30).
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Proof of Proposition 4.6
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Proposition 4.5. From condition (31) and equation (48)
we obtain
(1− β)Ψ(γ
β
) = φτ˜ −G+ σ
1− σ
[
n−
(
γ
β
)− 1−σ
σ
]
+
(
γ
β
− n
1− n
)− 1
σ
[
−1− β
β
− χγ
β2θ
(1− β) +
γ
β
− n
1− σ − (1− n)
]
<
1− β
β
1−( γβ − n
1− n
)− 1
σ
 = 1− β
β
[
ql(
γ
β
)− qnl(γ
β
)
]
from which we conclude Ψ( γ
β
) <
ql( γ
β
)−qnl( γ
β
)
β
. From condition (31) and equation (49) we obtain
(1− β)Ψ(R) = φτ˜ −G+
(
γ
β
)− 1
σ
[
− 1
β
+
γ
β
− χ γ
β + n(1− χ)(γ − β)
1− β
βθ
]
> 0
thus Ψ(R) > q
l(R)−qnl(R)
β
= 0. Therefore, from the intermediate value theorem, it should exist a
Rˆ ∈ (R, γ
β
) such that Ψ(Rˆ) = q
l(Rˆ)−qnl(Rˆ)
β
, which proves the existence of a stationary equilibrium
consistent with a binding no-default constraint.
Uniqueness follows from concavity of the function F(x): since Ψ( γ
β
) <
ql( γ
β
)−qnl( γ
β
)
β
, from (46)
and (47) we have F(g( γ
β
)) < 0; also, since Ψ(R) > q
l(R)−qnl(R)
β
, F(g(R)) > 0. Finally, notice that
F(g(Rˆ)) = 0. Then, by concavity of F , we have that F(x) < 0 if x ∈
[
g( γ
β
), g(Rˆ)
)
and F(x) > 0
if x ∈
(
Rˆ, g(R)
]
. Thus Ψ(R) > q
l(R)−qnl(R)
β
if R ∈ [R, Rˆ) and Ψ(R) < ql(R)−qnl(R)
β
if R >∈ (Rˆ, γ
β
].
Proof of Propostion 4.7
Proof. Following similar arguments to the ones in the proof of Proposition 4.5, using condition
(32) and equations (48) and (49) we can show that Ψ( γ
β
) <
ql( γ
β
)−qnl( γ
β
)
β
and Ψ(R) < q
l(R)−qnl(R)
β
.
Thus, from (46) and (47) we have F(g( γ
β
)) < 0 and F(g(R)) < 0. Next, from (33) there exists a Ro
such that Ψ(Ro) > q
l(Ro)−qnl(Ro)
β
, thus F(g(Ro)) > 0. From the intermediate value theorem, there
exist Ra and Rb such that F(g(Ra)) = F(g(Rb)) = 0, and thus thus Ψ(Ra) = ql(Ra)−qnl(Ra)
β
and
Ψ(Rb) = q
l(Rb)−qnl(Rb)
β
. Moreover, from concavity of F(·) we have F(x) > 0 if x ∈ (g(Ra), g(Rb)),
and F(x) < 0 if x < g(Ra) or x > g(Rb), which proves that there are exactly two stationary
equilibria, corresponding to the nominal interest rate Ra and Rb.
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Proof of Proposition 4.8
Proof. Following similar arguments to the ones in the proof of Proposition 4.5, using condi-
tion (34) and equations (48) we can show that Ψ( γ
β
) >
ql( γ
β
)−qnl( γ
β
)
β
, then an equilibrium with
a slack no-default constraint exists. Also from condition (34) and (49) and we can show that
Ψ(R) < q
l(R)−qnl(R)
β
. Thus, from (46) and (47) we have F(g( γ
β
)) > 0 and F(g(R)) < 0. From the
intermediate value theorem, there exists a Rˆ such that F(g(Rˆ)) = 0, and thus Ψ(Rˆ) = ql(Rˆ)−qnl(Rˆ)
β
.
Thus, there esists an equilibrium consistent with a binding no-default constraint corresponding to
the nominal interest rate Rˆ. Finally, from concavity of F(·) we have F(x) > 0 if x ∈ (g( γ
β
), g(Rˆ)),
and F(x) < 0 if x ∈ (g(Rˆ), g(R)). Thus there exists no other equilibrium consistent with a binding
no-default constraint.
Proof of Proposition 4.9
Proof. If lending in DM was subject to limited pledgeability, a stationary monetary equilibrium
with a slack no-default constraint would be characterized by (λl, λm, ql, qnl, R) satisfying equations
(22), (23), (24), λl = λm, and
ql − qnl
β
< (1− χ)R q
nl
β θ
Thus, it is easy to show that a unique stationary monetary equilibrium with a slack pledgeability
constraint exists if the following parameter restriction is satisfied:19
[
γ
β
− n
1− n
]− 1
σ [
1 +
(1− χ)
θ
γ
β
]
> 1 (50)
Similarly, an equilibrium with a binding pledgeability constraint would be characterized by (λl, λm, ql, qnl, R)
satisfying equations (22), (23), (24), λl = λm
ql − qnl
β
= (1− χ)R q
nl
β θ
19This condition comes from the equilibrium conditions ql = q∗ = 1, qnl = βγφm, R =
γ
β , and
−1 + β
γ
[nu′(ql) + (1− n)u′(qnl)] = 0
ql − qnl
β
= l < (1− χ)R φb
γ
= (1− χ)R φm
γ θ
= (1− χ)R q
nl
β θ
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Thus, it is easy to show that a stationary monetary equilibrium with a binding pledgeability
constraint exists if there exists a qnl ∈
[( γ
β
−n
1−n
)− 1
σ
,
(
γ
β
)− 1
σ
]
satisfying the following condition:20
H(qnl) = qnl
1 + (1− χ)γ
βθ
1
1 + (1− χ)
[
γ
β
− n− (1− n)q−σnl
]
− [ γβ − (1− n)q−σnl
n
]− 1
σ
= 0 (51)
Notice that
H
[ γβ − n
1− n
]− 1
σ
 = [ γβ − n
1− n
]− 1
σ [
1 +
(1− χ)
θ
γ
β
]
− 1
Thus, a sufficient condition for the equilibrium with a pledgeability constraint to be unique is
H′(qnl) > 0. Computing H′(qnl) we obtain
H′(qnl) = 1 + (1− χ)γ
βθ
1
1 + (1− χ)
[
γ
β
− n− (1− n)q−σnl
]
− qnl (1− χ)γ
βθ
(1− χ)(1− n)σq−(1+σ)nl{
1 + (1− χ)
[
γ
β
− n− (1− n)q−σnl
]}2 + 1− nn q−(1+σ)nl
= 1 +
1− n
n
q
−(1+σ)
nl
+
(1− χ)γ
βθ
1
1 + (1− χ)
[
γ
β
− n− (1− n)q−σnl
]
1− (1− χ)(1− n)σq−σnl
1 + (1− χ)
[
γ
β
− n− (1− n)q−σnl
]

Thus, a sufficient condition for H′(qnl) > 0 (in the interval for qnl we are interested in) is that the
term in the last parenthesis is positive. After rearranging, this requires the following condition to
hold:
1 + (1− χ)
[
γ
β
− n
]
> (1− χ)(1− n)q−σnl
[
1 + σ
]
Notice that this condition is more difficult to satisfy when qnl =
( γ
β
−n
1−n
)− 1
σ
. Replacing such a
value for qnl in the last expression, we obtain that a sufficient condition for H′(qnl) > 0 for all
20This condition comes from the equilibrium conditions qnl = βγφm, R =
γ
β[1+n(1−χ)(u′(ql)−1)] , and
−1 + β
γ
[nu′(ql) + (1− n)u′(qnl)] = 0
ql − qnl
β
= l = (1− χ)R φb
γ
= (1− χ)R φm
γ θ
= (1− χ)R q
nl
β θ
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qnl ∈
[( γ
β
−n
1−n
)− 1
σ
,
(
γ
β
)− 1
σ
]
is
σ <
1
(1− χ)
[
γ
β
− n
]
which concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5.3
Proof. Consider the decrease in the money to bond ratio from θ to θ′, where θ′ < θ.
1. If (31) is satisfied both at θ and θ′, from Proposition 4.6 in both cases there exists a unique
equilibrium consistent with a biding no-default constraint. Specifically, in the first case the
equilibrium with a binding no-default constraint is characterized by Rˆ such that q
l(Rˆ)−qnl(Rˆ)
β
=
Ψ(Rˆ; θ), and in the second case by Rˆ′ such that q
l(Rˆ′)−qnl(Rˆ′)
β
= Ψ(Rˆ′; θ′), where ql(R) and
qnl(R) are defined in (27) and Ψ(R; θ) in (28). Also, from (28) observe that Ψ(R; θ) >
Ψ(R, θ′) for all R ∈ [R, γ
β
]. Then, we obtain
ql(Rˆ)− qnl(Rˆ)
β
= Ψ(Rˆ; θ) > Ψ(Rˆ; θ′).
Also, since (31) is satisfied both at θ and θ′, we know that
ql(R)− qnl(R)
β
< Ψ(R; θ′)
Thus, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a Rˆ′′ ∈ (R, Rˆ) such that ql(Rˆ′′)−qnl(Rˆ′′)
β
=
Ψ(Rˆ′′; θ′). Because, also with θ′, there exists a unique equilibrium consistent with a binding
no-default constraint, it must be that Rˆ′ = Rˆ′′, so that Rˆ′ < Rˆ. Thus, a decrease in the
money to bond ratio lowers equilibrium interest rate.
2. If (32) and (33) are satisfied both at θ and θ′, from Proposition 4.7 there exist two stationary
equilibria consistent with a binding no-default constraint, Rˆ1 and Rˆ2 when the money to
bond ratio is θ, as well as two stationary equilibria Rˆ′1 and Rˆ′2 consistent with a biding no-
default constraint when the money to bond ratio is θ′. Specifically, q
l(Rˆ1)−qnl(Rˆ1)
β
= Ψ(Rˆ1; θ),
ql(Rˆ2)−qnl(Rˆ2)
β
= Ψ(Rˆ2; θ),
ql(Rˆ′1)−qnl(Rˆ′1)
β
= Ψ(Rˆ′1; θ),
ql(Rˆ′2)−qnl(Rˆ′2)
β
= Ψ(Rˆ′2; θ). Also, from the
proof of Proposition 4.7, observe that q
l(R)−qnl(R)
β
> Ψ(R; θ) if R ∈ (Rˆ1, Rˆ2), and ql(R)−qnl(R)β <
Ψ(R; θ) if R ∈ (R, Rˆ1) or R ∈ (Rˆ2, γβ ). Finally, from (28) observe that Ψ(R; θ) > Ψ(R, θ′)
for all R ∈ [R, γ
β
].
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Let then solve
Ro
′
= argmax
R∈[R,R)
{
Ψ(R; θ′)− q
l(R)− qnl(R)
β
}
.
We know that Ψ(Ro′ ; θ′) − ql(Ro
′
)−qnl(Ro′ )
β
> 0 because (33) is satisfied at θ′. Observe then
that Ro′ ∈ (Rˆ1, Rˆ2). Indeed, for R ∈ (R, Rˆ1] or R ∈ [Rˆ2, γβ ), we have q
l(R)−qnl(R)
β
≤ Ψ(R; θ) <
Ψ(R; θ′). In summary, we have Ψ(Rˆ1; θ′) < Ψ(Rˆ1; θ) = q
l(Rˆ1)−qnl(Rˆ1)
β
, Ψ(Rˆ2; θ′) < Ψ(Rˆ2; θ) =
ql(Rˆ2)−qnl(Rˆ2)
β
, and Ψ(Ro′ ; θ′) > q
l(Ro
′
)−qnl(Ro′ )
β
. Then by the intermediate value theorem there
exist at least two interest rates Rˆ′′1 < Rˆ′′2 ∈ (Rˆ1, Rˆ2) such that q
l(Rˆ′′1 )−qnl(Rˆ′′1 )
β
= Ψ(Rˆ′′1; θ
′) and
ql(Rˆ′′2 )−qnl(Rˆ′′2 )
β
= Ψ(Rˆ′′2; θ
′). Because, also with θ′, there exists two equilibria consistent with a
binding no-default constraint, it must be that Rˆ′1 = Rˆ′′1, and Rˆ′2 = Rˆ′′2 so that Rˆ′1 > Rˆ1 and
Rˆ′2 > Rˆ2. Thus, a decrease in the money to bond ratio increases equilibrium interest rate at
the low equilibrium and decreases equilibrium interest rate at the high equilibrium.
3. If (34) is satisfied both at θ and θ′ from Proposition 4.8 in both cases an equilibrium consistent
with a biding no-default constraint coexists with an equilibrium consistent with a slack no-
default constraint. At the equilibrium consistent with the slack no-default constraint, open-
market operations have no effects from Proposition 5.1. The equilibrium consistent with a
binding no-default constraint is characterized by Rˆ such that q
l(Rˆ)−qnl(Rˆ)
β
= Ψ(Rˆ; θ) when
the money to bond ratio is θ and by Rˆ′ such that q
l(Rˆ′)−qnl(Rˆ′)
β
= Ψ(Rˆ′; θ′) when the money
to bond ratio is θ′. Also, from (28) observe that Ψ(R; θ) > Ψ(R, θ′) for all R ∈ [R, γ
β
]. Then,
we obtain
ql(Rˆ)− qnl(Rˆ)
β
= Ψ(Rˆ; θ) > Ψ(Rˆ; θ′).
Also, since (34) is satisfied both at θ and θ′, we know that
ql( γ
β
)− qnl( γ
β
)
β
< Ψ(
γ
β
; θ′)
Thus, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a Rˆ′′ ∈ (Rˆ, γ
β
) such that q
l(Rˆ′′)−qnl(Rˆ′′)
β
=
Ψ(Rˆ′′; θ′). Because, also with θ′, the equilibrium consistent with a binding no-default con-
straint is unique, it must be that Rˆ′ = Rˆ′′, so that Rˆ′ > Rˆ. Thus, a decrease in the money
to bond ratio increases equilibrium interest rate.
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Proof of Proposition 5.4
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 4.9, an equilibrium with a binding pledge-abiligy constraint
is given by a qnl ∈
[( γ
β
−n
1−n
)− 1
σ
,
(
γ
β
)− 1
σ
]
such that H(qnl; θ) = 0, where H(q; θ) is defined in (51).
Let then qnl be the equilibrium consumption in states where credit is not feasible associated
to the money to bond ratio θ, and qnl′ be equilibrium consumption in states where credit is not
feasible when the money to bond ratio θ′. Thus
H(qnl; θ) = H(qnl′ ; θ′) = 0.
Notice that, for θ′ < θ, equation (51) implies that H(q; θ) < H(q; θ′). Since from the assumption
that σ < 1
(1−χ)[ γβ−n]
we know from the proof of Proposition 4.9 that H(q; θ) is increasing in q,
it must be that qnl′ > qnl. Thus, since qnl is inversely related to R from equation (27), we can
conclude that R′ > R. Therefore a decrease in the money to bond ratio increases equilibrium
interest rate (at the equilibrium associated with a binding limited pledgeability constraint).
Proof of Proposition 5.5
Proof. Suppose that equation (34) is satisfied, n < 1−β
γ−β , σ <
1
(1−χ)( γβ−n)
. Let
A(θ) =
σ
1− σ
[
n−
(
γ
β
)− 1−σ
σ
]
+
(
γ
β
− n
1− n
)− 1
σ
[
γ
β
− n
1− σ − (1− n)−
χγ(1− β)
θβ2
]
− 1− β
β
B(θ) =
(
γ
β
)− 1
σ
[
γ − 1
β
− χ
βθ
γ(1− β)
β + n(1− χ)(γ − β)
]
,
Notice that we can rewrite (34) as
A(θ) > G− φτ˜ > B(θ)
Also, observe that A′(θ) > 0 and B′(θ) > 0. Finally, notice that we can rewrite (35) as
G− φτ˜ < min{A,B}
where A = limθ→∞A(θ) and B = limθ→∞B(θ). Then, by continuity of A(θ) and B(θ) if (35) holds
there exists a θ′ such that (30) is satisfied for all θ > θ′. On the other hand, if (35) is violated,
then (30) is violated for all θ ∈ <+.
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